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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE

AP.ncLE 11 - PooR PERSONS
CPLR 1102: Neither constitutional nor statutory authority exists for
court to order compensation of counsel representingan indigent party
in a matrimonial action.
In Boddie v. Connecticut,55 the United States Supreme Court held
that a state could not deny an indigent plaintiff seeking a divorce decree
access to its courts solely because the plaintiff could not pay filing and
service of process fees. Such a denial of access is violative of due process,
the Court concluded, since the state monopolizes the means of dissolving a marriage.5 6 New York courts have since applied this holding to
auxiliary expenses, such as publication costs. 57 However, the precise
application of Boddie is uncertain where counsel fees are encountered.
More specifically, under CPLR 1102, a court, upon a proper showing of
indigency, may appoint counsel to represent a party in a civil action. 58
Yet, in matrimonial actions, the question remains whether a court has
the constitutional or statutory authority to compel a local unit of government to pay the fees of counsel representing an indigent party.
In Vanderpoolv. Vanderpool,59 the Supreme Court, Kings County,
directed the City of New York to either provide counsel to an indigent
defendant in a divorce action, or pay the fees of counsel selected by the
defendant. In so holding, Justice Heller relied upon the due process
rationale advanced in both Boddie and Deason v. Deason,60 rather than
CPLR 1102.61 On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department,
55 401 US. 371 (1971).
56 Id. at 375. For example, N.Y. CONsr. art. I, § 9 provides that divorces may only be

granted by "due judicial proceedings."
57 See, e.g., Deason v. Deason, 32 N.Y.2d 93, 296 N.E.2d 229, 343 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1973);
Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 38 App. Div. 2d 431, 330 N.Y.S.2d 550 (2d Dep't 1972); McCandless v.
McCandless, 38 App. Div. 2d 171, 327 N.Y.S.2d 896 (4th Dep't 1972).
Outside the matrimonial sphere, the First Department, on the authority of Boddie,
has held that an indigent tenant is entitled to assigned counsel and witness fees in an
eviction proceeding. Hotel Martha Washington Management Co. v. Swinick, 66 Misc. 2d
833, 322 N.Y.S.2d 139 (App. T. Ist Dep't 1971), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46
ST. JOHN'S L. RlV. 355, 368 (1971).
58 CPLR 1102(a) provides that "[t]he court in its order permitting a person to proceed

as a poor person may assign an attorney." Precisely what "may" means in this context
remains unresolved. See 2 WK&M
1102.01 (suggesting the appointment of counsel is
discretionary). But see 7B McKiNNEY'S CPLR 1102, commentary at 480 (1963) (suggesting
that the validity of an order to proceed as a poor person when the court does not appoint
counsel is an open question).
G9 74 Misc. 2d 122, 344 N.Y.S.2d 572, rev'd sub nom. Jacox v. Jacox, 43 App. Div. 2d
716, 350 N.Y.S.2d 435 (2d Dep't 1974) (mem.).
60 32 N.Y.2d 93, 296 N.E.2d 229, 343 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1973).

61 The court held that the indigent defendant in a matrimonial action "may not be
denied the right to counsel because she is without funds." 74 Misc. 2d at 126, 344 N.Y.S.2d
at 577. Justice Heller went on to characterize counsel fees as "auxiliary costs" which barred
the defendant's access to court. Courts have held that the local or state government must
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in Jacox v. Jacox, 62 reversed Vanderpool. The court, in a memorandum
opinion, concluded that although CPLR 1102 permitted a court to
assign an attorney to a poor person, there was neither "constitutional
nor statutory authority"6 3 for a court to order a local government to
provide compensated counsel or pay the fee of counsel selected by the
indigent party. The Second Department observed that, absent statutory
authority for ordering compensation of counsel in matrimonial actions,
trial courts must assign members of the bar to provide uncompensated
representation for the indigent.6 4
Given the reluctance of the Second Department to permit the
court-ordered compensation of counsel representing an indigent person
in a matrimonial action, it would appear that the time is appropriate
for the Legislature to authorize such procedure.6 5 Not only would
legislation in this area remove a financial burden from assigned counsel,
but more significantly, such an arrangement would afford an indigent
party in a matrimonial action the opportunity to select his own counsel.
Consequently, reliance upon the court to make such a selection would
be eliminated.
ARTICLE 14 - CONTRIBUTION
CPLR art. 14: New articleenacted to deal with contributionin light of
Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.
The Legislature has amended the CPLR to bring it into conformity with the Court of Appeals' decision in Dole v. Dow Chemical
Co." Newly enacted section 140167 allows a claim for contribution beassume the responsibility of paying auxiliary expenses which bar an indigent plaintiff's
access to a court in a matrimonial action. See cases cited in note 57 supra.
62 43 App. Div. 2d 716, 350 N.Y.S.2d 435 (2d Dep't 1973) (mem.). Consolidated for
appeal in Jacox were three orders of the Supreme Court, Kings County, directing the
City of New York to furnish counsel within a specified time to indigent defendants in
matrimonial actions. The lower court had further directed that if these orders were not
complied with, the defendant in each action could retain counsel. Thereafter, the court
would set the attorneys' fee and direct the city to pay the fee. Id. at 717, 350 N.YS.2d at
430.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 717, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 437. The court in Vanderpool had acknowledged that it
lacked a statutory basis for ordering compensation of counsel. 74 Misc. 2d at 123, 344
N.Y.S.2d at 574.
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court, St. Lawrence County, has held that it
would be improvident at the present time to impose the expense of compensated counsel
upon local government in matrimonial actions. Instead, the court suggested that members of the local bar provide their services without compensation. See Bartlett v. Kitchin,
76 Misc. 2d 1087, 352 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. St. Lawrence County 1973).
65Justice Shea, in Bartlett v. Kitchin, 76 Misc. 2d 1087, 352 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct.
St. Lawrence County 1973), observed that unless legislative change in this area occurred
soon, court-ordered compensation of counsel for indigent parties may be forthcoming.
66 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
67 N.Y. SEss. LAws [1974], ch. 742, § 1 (McKinney).

